Religious disagreements are widespread. People
across the world, many of whom are seen as experts in their communities -
priests, theologians, monks—disagree about the most basic facts of religion,
for instance, about whether we can survive physical death, or whether there are
one or more gods. As a philosopher, I’m interested what religious disagreement
means and I am currently writing a monograph with Cambridge University Press on
this topic, supported by research leave provided by Brookes. I think this work
is important in the light of increasing polarization of beliefs about a wide
range of topics such as economics and climate change, along political fault lines.
Such polarization has given rise to a mistrust of experts (“We have enough of
experts”, as Michael Gove recently said).
There seems to be an assumption that diversity in opinion among experts means that experts don’t know anything. Moreover, there is a worry for the public that it is hard to decide which expert to trust if experts don’t agree among themselves. My work will use tools from social epistemology – the philosophical study of how our beliefs are shaped in a social context – to help us find out what we do when we are faced with expert disagreement.
There seems to be an assumption that diversity in opinion among experts means that experts don’t know anything. Moreover, there is a worry for the public that it is hard to decide which expert to trust if experts don’t agree among themselves. My work will use tools from social epistemology – the philosophical study of how our beliefs are shaped in a social context – to help us find out what we do when we are faced with expert disagreement.
Religious disagreement among experts gives rise
to many philosophical questions. First, there is the question of what an expert
on religion might be. There are notions of expertise which see an expert as
someone who has a lot of true beliefs, compared to others. The problem here is
that it’s difficult to make out which beliefs are true. For religion, we face
the additional problem that it is impossible to test who is right (e.g., about
the afterlife, or the existence of God). A more useful notion might be a social
notion of expertise, which has to do with an expert’s standing in the
community. Take a rabbi in Judaism. Rabbis aren’t priests—the rituals rabbis
can perform are the same as what other adult men (and in progressive Jewish
communities, women) can do. Rabbis,
rather, are seen as people who have expert knowledge of Jewish law.
The philosopher Alvin Goldman has a hybrid notion
of expertise that combines the social notion with the ability of experts to do
things. Experts are people who can do things in their domain of expertise. Car
mechanics fix cars, doctors can diagnose illness and propose remedies. Experts
often help us by ‘imparting
to the layperson (or other client) his/her distinctive knowledge or skills’, as
Goldman puts it. The doctor helps you by telling you why you have painful
joints (‘e.g., you have rheumatoid arthritis’), and can prescribe medications
to manage the disease. This is a very useful notion of expertise as it gets
around the problem of testing what an expert says is true, and can help us deal
with disagreement.
Religious experts can,
in this view, help us to do things in the religious domain, such as perform
rituals correctly (in many religious traditions, laypeople can’t perform many
crucial rituals on their own. This is the case with Roman Catholicism, for
example, which requires a priest to celebrate the Eucharist. They also have
expert knowledge about the domain in question, for example, about religious law
or theological doctrine.
How, then, as a novice
do you decide which religious experts to trust, especially if they disagree? You
cannot evaluate the content of what they are saying since they are experts and
you are not. The epistemologist Linda Zagzebski argues that we should choose
our experts and then simply follow everything they are saying in that domain.
Your expert is your guru. The problem is that it seems like a bad idea to
screen off your own reasoning and beliefs. What if you pick someone who argues
the Earth is flat?
Recently, I’ve been
looking into Maimonides, Mōšeh bēn-Maymōn, a twelfth-century Jewish philosopher who
wrote the influential Guide for the Perplexed (ca 1190), which was ostensibly
written for a student who could not decide between the teachings of religion
and natural science (which was called natural philosophy in those days).
Maimonides lived in an intensely multicultural society, growing up in Cordoba,
and then moving on to Fez in Morocco. All were areas which had multiple
religions: Judaism, Islam and Christianity. There was also a large influence from
natural philosophy, in particular Aristotle. Maimonides considered how to
evaluate the testimonies of venerated Rabbinic scholars, the so-called Hazal or sages of the
first five centuries. The Hazal were influential in shaping the Jewish
tradition, including many practices of everyday religious observation. Maimonides
respected their judgment very much, but he still did not think that a novice
should put blind faith in what they wrote.
Maimonides considered
what a reader should do if one of the sages plainly contradicted what was known
from science. He urged the reader not to follow these sages disregarding other
things they knew, or if what they said seemed to contradict common sense: ‘it
is not proper to abandon matters of reason that have already been verified by
proofs, shake loose of them, and depend on the words of a single one of the
sages from whom possibly the matter was hidden...A man should never cast his
reason behind him, for the eyes are set in front, not in back.’ He also
exhorted readers to think about the cultural context in which these authors
lived: ‘Do not ask me
to show that everything they [the Sages] have said concerning astronomical
matters conforms to the way things really are. For at that time mathematics was
imperfect.’ Maimonides thought that one should resist the halo effect: rabbis
are experts in Jewish law; that does not mean they are experts in other
matters.
So, what lessons can we draw from this, given
that our society is highly secularized, that most people in the UK do not
follow any religious experts, and are not religiously observant. However, some
people continue to do so—they try to be practicing Jews, Christians, Muslims,
Sikhs, etc.
Ultimately, you cannot
escape a certain arbitrariness in how your beliefs are shaped. The beliefs we
are ultimately attracted to, or interested in, are shaped by forces beyond our
control such as our upbringing and which experts happen to be the ones trusted
in our community. Inevitably, if you follow a religious expert you will not be
in a position to evaluate if what the expert says is plausible. However, even
if you pick one expert, or a set of experts in a religious tradition, it is
wise to not disregard what you know from other fields such as science.
Dr Helen de Cruz Senior Lecturer in Philosophy
Picture: religious leaders – Wikimedia